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Empirical evaluations of trade agreements often rely on descriptive statistics or univariate 
time series methods to detect subsequent changes in trade flows.  We conduct a more 
satisfactory test by evaluating an agreement in the context of a structural econometric 
model.  Consistent with trade theory, import demand is modeled as a cointegrating 
relationship with income and relative price variables, where trade agreements may cause 
structural changes in cointegrating vectors.  This approach is applied to study the effect 
of several U.S.-Japan market-opening trade agreements; in three of seven industries we 
find evidence of structural change that may be related to trade agreements.  
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  International trade is governed by a complicated patchwork of international 
treaties, bilateral agreements, and unilateral actions, often directed at trade in very 
specific commodities.  A determination of the impact of trade measures begins with an 
assessment of their direct effect on trade volumes and prices in targeted sectors.  While in 
some cases—such as the recent U.S. anti-dumping duties on steel—the measures have 
readily identifiable impacts, in others cases the effects are more difficult to determine.   
  Examples of the latter are recent measures to “open” Japanese markets to foreign 
products.  For many years, foreign companies and governments have complained that 
Japanese markets were unfairly protected from foreign competition by a range of 
regulations, licensing requirements and government procurement policies that are not 
addressed by traditional trade liberalization measures.
1  Over the past two decades, the 
Japanese government has entered into a number of bilateral trade agreements designed to 
increase import access.  Among the most visible of the market opening policies have 
been the so-called Voluntary Import Expansion policies, Japanese commitments (or 
targets, depending on whom you ask) to raise foreign market share in key Japanese 
sectors.  These include the U.S.-Japan semiconductor accord of 1986 and the auto parts 
agreements reached in 1992 and 1995.  But, they also include licensing concessions, 
agreements on standards, and changes in government procurement designed to raise 
foreign import access.
2  In this paper we evaluate the impact of several U.S.-Japan trade   2
agreements on targeted Japanese industries within a structural econometric model of 
trade. 
  While the wide range of import expansion measures looks impressive on paper, it 
is less clear how big an impact they have had on trade patterns.  Critics have charged that 
some measures are simply window dressing, intended to mollify foreign governments 
without requiring painful adjustments by Japanese firms.  In other cases, the apparent 
magnitude of incentives appears too small to create incentives for change.  Our objective 
is to look for empirical evidence of import expansion effects for a subset of targeted 
industries over the 1980-2000 period.   
  As we discuss below, there are a number of studies of U.S.-Japan trade policy that 
bear on this issue.  These studies range from survey evaluations of American businesses 
operating in Japan to univariate statistical tests of import change to limited econometric 
studies.  In this paper, we look for evidence that trade agreements altered import patterns 
using a system-based time series methodology.  Our approach permits us to test for 
changes in import behavior within the context of a structural econometric trade model.  
Our methodology, based on Hansen (2001), estimates a cointegrating relationship 
describing the long-run evolution of imports in each sector, and tests for a structural 
break in that relationship.  An indication of a structural break in close proximity to an 
import expansion agreement is interpreted as evidence that the agreement significantly 
altered import behavior relative to the path predicted by the evolution of economic 
fundamentals. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we outline the U.S.-Japan 
market-opening trade agreements that are the focus of our research, and we review   3
existing evidence on the effectiveness of such agreements.  Section 3 presents the 
standard empirical trade model.  In section 4, we describe our methodology for 
evaluating structural change within a behavioral trade model.  Section 5 presents results, 
and concluding observations are given in section 6. 
 
II. U.S.-Japan Market-Opening Trade Agreements 
  The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) has catalogued and 
undertaken opinion surveys of the effectiveness of major negotiated policy changes 
affecting U.S. trade with Japan.  ACCJ (1997) identified over 45 significant “market-
opening” trade agreements between 1980 and 1996, a survey later extended (ACCJ, 
2000) to include an additional 18 agreements made in recent years.  We will examine 
some of the more notable and well-defined agreements reached prior to 1996, including 
autos, auto parts, tobacco, semiconductors, paper, medical products, and lumber.  A 
timeline of these measures is given in Table 1.  The following is a brief description of 
each agreement. 
  Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 
  As an outgrowth of the Market-Oriented, Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks, this 1986 
agreement introduced more transparency and reduced regulations in the approval process 
for foreign drugs as well as eased approval and licensing for medical products.  In most 
cases, data from foreign clinical trials could now be used, eliminating the need for costly 
and redundant domestic trials.  A second agreement, in 1994, established more 
transparent procedures for Japanese government procurement of medical products and   4
services.  ACCJ members initially gave the 1986 agreements high marks for improving 
market access, although the year 2000 report raised concerns about remaining regulatory 
hurdles.  Public procurement was viewed as much improved following the 1994 accord.  
  Semiconductors 
  The Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA) consisted of two five-year 
agreements (1986, 1991) which had two goals: (1) to institute Fair Market Values 
(FMVs) for Japanese exports, essentially creating a price floor; and (2) to increase 
foreign market share of semiconductors from around 8 percent 20 percent.  (A 1996 
follow-on agreement is not considered in our analysis.)  Some observers (Tyson, 1992, 
for example) have hailed the agreement as a very successful strategic trade policy.  The 
ACCJ (1997) survey found the STA contributed to increased access for U.S. chips 
makers.  The theoretical literature (Greaney, 1996; Nakamura, 1995; Parsons, 2000) 
generally finds such a policy distortionary and welfare reducing, however.   
Tobacco 
This 1986 agreement eliminated high tariffs on tobacco and additional retail taxes 
that were imposed on foreign tobacco products. In a separate understanding, foreign 
cigarettes were given equal treatment to domestic brands in the distribution channels 
managed by Japan Tobacco Inc., the government tobacco monopoly.  ACCJ 
representatives viewed these agreements as very successful, and import market share 
increased substantially in succeeding years. 
  Paper and Paper Products   5
  The 1992 measures to increase market access for paper products neither reduced 
formal trade barriers nor set numerical targets as in the case of semiconductors.  
Nonetheless, efforts were made by Japanese authorities to promote foreign paper 
products in Japan in part by providing market information and in some cases offering 
low-interest loans to foreign suppliers.  U.S. authorities also attempted to promote U.S. 
exports to Japan by encouraging U.S. firms to respond to requirements of Japanese 
producers such as quality, metric sizing and delivery.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this policy 
was ranked as very ineffective according to the ACCJ, and little nominal growth in paper 
product imports occurred. 
 Wood  Products 
  Also, as part of the 1986 MOSS talks, Japan agreed to tariff reductions on 
plywood and veneers, some wood products and lumber.  They also began to make 
concessions on building codes and standards to permit increased use of foreign wood 
products in construction.  More progress on building standards was made after the 1990 
agreement, influenced in part by a U.S. Super 301 Trade Action that identified wood 
product imports as facing unreasonable restrictions.  Tariffs were further reduced, and 
subsidies were also pared.  Industry observers gave the 1990 agreement high marks but 
reported only limited progress in raising import volume, perhaps in part because of the 
weak conditions prevailing during the 1990s in the economy generally and in the 
construction industry specifically.  (A 1997 agreement on graded lumber was not 
included in our analysis.) 
  Autos and Auto Parts     6
  Three agreements (1987, 1992, and 1995) cover auto imports and procurement of 
American auto parts by Japanese companies.  The most significant agreement, in 1992, 
laid out numerical targets believed by both sides to be attainable.  In particular, there was 
the expectation that Japanese imports of U.S. auto parts would double to $4 billion by 
1994, and that overall procurement of American parts by Japanese companies would rise 
by $10 billion during the same time frame.  The 1992 agreement also included 
commitments by Japanese auto manufacturers to “design in” more American parts and 
U.S. and Japanese efforts to promote U.S. auto exports.  The numerical goals of the 
agreement were substantially met.  Though a relatively small measure quantitatively, the 
1992 auto accord represents (with the STA) one of the few examples of results-oriented 
trade policies (ROTPs) between the U.S. and Japan.   
  Other industries targeted for import promotion have included computers and 
electronics, satellites, leather, apples, telecommunications, building and contracting, flat 
glass, beef and citrus, and a number of service areas.  Generally the agreements 
governing these sectors are not amenable to analysis using the structural econometric 
techniques of this paper either because data at a suitable level of disaggregation is not 
available, or because the industry was subject to additional quantitative restrictions that 
may obscure detection of policy effects.  See ACCJ (1997, 2000) for a complete 
description of U.S.-Japan trade agreements. 
There are a number of existing empirical studies of the impact of market-opening 
Japanese trade agreements.  These studies include business surveys and descriptive 
analyses of trade patterns, as well as more formal econometric tests of structural change 
either in a single equation or multivariate setting.     7
In addition to the ACCJ opinion surveys of American companies doing business 
in Japan, Bayard and Elliot (1994) and Elliot and Richardson (1997) use data from the 
US Trade Representative’s office and interviews to evaluate the effects of actions taken 
under section 301 of the U.S. trade law. 
Other researchers have used descriptive statistics to evaluate the success of trade 
agreements.  Gold and Nanto (1991) compare post-agreement growth rates of U.S. 
exports to Japan with growth rates to the world over the 1985-1990 period and find that 
targeted sectors did grow faster.  Greaney (2001) looks for evidence that a range of 
measures identified in the ACCJ study stimulated import growth by comparing pre- and 
post-implementation growth rates for imports in targeted sectors, and by comparing 
growth rates in targeted sectors to overall import performance.  She finds no consistent 
pattern of real increases in Japanese imports of U.S. goods targeted for increases, 
although she does find some evidence that U.S.-Japan agreements benefited third 
countries. 
The Semiconductor Trade Agreement has been the subject of considerable recent 
research.  Theoretical studies (Greaney, 1996; Nakamura, 1995; Krishna, Roy, and 
Thursby, 1996) have suggested that the agreement may have facilitated collusive 
behavior by semiconductor producers, with possibly ambiguous effects on import 
volumes.  Indeed most empirical studies have found that the fair market value 
requirements (FMVs) of the STA acted as a price support for Japanese exports (see 
Flamm, 1996; Dick, 1994; Irwin, 1994; Tyson, 1992). There is little consensus on 
whether the STA was effective in increasing the foreign market share.  Several authors 
have argued (Sumita and Shin, 1996; Flamm, 1996; Bergsten and Noland, 1993) that   8
although the STA may have had some effect on foreign market presence, other factors 
such as the shift in demand for those integrated circuits for which U.S. firms had a 
comparative advantage may have explained at least some of the gain in market share.  
However, Bergsten and Noland (1993) find in their calculations that not all of the shift 
towards foreign made chips can be attributed to changes in industry patterns alone and 
attribute the residual to the STA.  Flamm (1996), using similar calculations, arrives at the 
same conclusion.   
We are aware of very few econometric studies of U.S.-Japan trade agreements.  
Greaney (2001) constructs Chow tests for structural breaks in import time series and 
surprisingly finds more evidence that U.S.-Japan agreements raised Japan’s imports from 
third countries than from the U.S.  Noland (1997) uses a gravity model of U.S. trade 
patterns and finds little evidence of trade agreement impacts.  Baker, Gross and Tower 
(1997) estimate trend models for several measures of U.S. export performance in wood 
products and find no evidence that Super 301 trade sanctions increased U.S. wood 
products exports to Japan. 
A problem with non-structural analyses of trade agreements is that it is difficult to 
interpret a detected break in the time series.  As Greaney (2001) acknowledges, finding a 
structural break in an import series only indicates a regime shift, but can say nothing 
about the source of the observed change.  In particular, import volumes can change 
dramatically if there are sharp changes in fundamental variables upon which they depend.  
A structural model of trade is needed to capture these effects.  
   9
III.  Structural Import Models 
Typically import demand functions are derived from micro-based consumer 
optimization theory where it is assumed that imported and domestic goods are imperfect 
substitutes.
3  Two factors drive the demand for imports: income and relative prices.  
Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure) is often used as a proxy for income or domestic 
demand and a ratio of import prices to some domestic price index (usually the wholesale 
price index) is used as a measure of relative prices. A log-linear form is used both for its 
convenience in calculating elasticities and because the log transformation yields 
smoother data for estimation purposes. 
4 
A typical import demand equation takes the form: 
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where M is real imports (deflated by the import price index), Y is real income and Pm and 
Pd  are import and domestic price indexes, T is a time trend, and ut reflects measurement 
error.  Distributed lags of the dependent and independent variables are included to 
capture dynamic effects and correct for serial correlation of the residuals.  A common 
form of (1) includes a single lagged dependent variable and a one-year lag of the relative 
price term.  In the estimation below, the order of the lag polynomials is chosen 
empirically to be sufficiently long to yield approximately white noise errors. 
As model (1) is typically estimated using time-series data, OLS estimation in 
levels may yield a spurious regression.
5  In some cases, regressions with differenced data 
have been used to eliminate non-stationary regressors, although this approach will often 
neglect important long-run relationships.     10
In the 1990s, a number of economists began to estimate traditional import demand 
models using the cointegration techniques that emerged in the wake of Engle and 
Granger (1987) and others.  Both single-equation cointegration techniques as well as 
system approaches to cointegration were used.  An early example is Asseery and Peel 
(1991) where they implement an error-correction mechanism (ECM) approach and 
compare their results with more traditional econometric estimates of import demand.  
Rose (1991) and Rose and Yellen (1989) test for cointegration among the trade balance, 
income and relative prices.  Asseery and Peel find imports to be much less elastic with 
respect to income and prices than traditional long-run estimates.  Rose and Rose and 
Yellen find that the effect of the exchange rate on the trade balance is insignificant.  
Caporale and Chui (1999) measure income and price elasticities for overall exports and 
imports for 21 countries including Japan using ARDL and DOLS time series techniques.  
They find positive income elasticities—typically greater than unity—and modest 
negative relative import price elasticities.  
 
IV. Detecting Structural Breaks in an Import Model 
Most existing econometric trade papers assume that estimated cointegrating 
vectors represent stable long-run relationships among modeled variables, so that 
estimated parameters are taken as constant over time.   In this paper, we would like to test 
whether import expansion agreements caused detectable changes in the import demand 
relationship.  
Our approach is to estimate a traditional import demand function, relating real 
import volumes to real gross domestic expenditure and the relative import price, while   11
allowing for a structural break near the time of the trade agreement. If a structural break 
is found in the vicinity of a policy change, then we will interpret the result as suggestive 
that the trade policy is responsible for the structural change.  Of course such inference is 
far from clear-cut.  It is possible that other (non-modeled) changes in policy, the 
economic environment or firm or consumer behavior could also account for structural 
changes in the estimated equation. 
There are a number of previous papers that look for evidence of structural change 
in Japanese import relationships, including Corker (1989), Ochi and Utsunomiya (1993), 
Moriguchi (1993), Ceglowski (1996 and 1997).  Hamori and Matsubashi (2001) look for 
structural change in a cointegration framework.  Our research differs from these previous 
studies because it looks for evidence that structural change is linked to specific U.S.-
Japan trade agreements, and our analysis is conducted at a disaggregated level 
appropriate to answering these industry-level questions. 
 
Cointegration and Structural Change 
Cointegration takes note of the fact that two or more series that are I(1) processes, 
may, when regressed upon each other, result in some linear combination which is an I(0) 
process.  Although cointegration is purely a statistical concept, it lends itself to an 
economic interpretation as well, namely, that the cointegrating relationship itself may 
describe the long-run relationship between two or more variables, and that although the 
variables may drift apart, over the long run they will tend to move together. This also 
complements the equilibrium concept in economics where, although there may be short-  12
run dynamic fluctuations, market forces should bring variables “back-in-line” with each 
other in the long run.
6  
Important changes in policy or the economic regime may lead to changes in the 
long-run relationship.  We can therefore look for structural breaks in cointegrating 
relationships as evidence of the impact of a particular policy.  A number of alternative 
tests for structural change under cointegration have been proposed.  Quintos and Phillips 
(1993) develop tests for parameter constancy in cointegrating relations in a single-
equation.  Residual-based, single-equation methods have been developed by Gregory and 
Hansen (1996).  However, like residual-based tests generally, they have low power 
because they tend to neglect model dynamics.  (See Maddala and Kim, p. 203.)   In 
addition, single equation estimation methods may be inferior to systems methods for 
addressing problems of simultaneity and for identifying structural relationships.   
Vector autoregressive (VAR) approaches to testing for structural change 
implement Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to test for either a change in the rank 
or a change in parameters of the cointegrating vector(s).  The literature in this area is very 
limited.  Hansen and Johansen (1993) develop tests for a change in the rank of the 
system, that is, the number of independent cointegrating relationships.  Their method 
involves splitting the sample into two sub-samples and then testing whether or not the 
number of cointegrating vectors suggested by trace and/or eigenvalue tests are different.  
Seo (1998) uses a Lagrange multiplier test for a single structural change in the 
cointegrating and/or adjustment vectors at an unknown time period, against the 
alternative of constant parameters.     13
In this paper, we apply a framework due to Hansen (2001), which permits 
likelihood ratio tests for structural change at (possibly multiple) hypothesized break 
points.  Hansen’s technique is particularly appropriate in this setting, because market-
opening trade agreements, if effective, would be expected to change parameters of long-
run demand relationships—either price and income elasticities or deterministic 
components—at or near the time of the agreement.  Hansen’s framework also allows for 
the possibility of non-constant cointegration rank and hypothesis testing under the 
assumption of structural change.
7 
Hansen considers a p-dimensional time series process Xt generated by the vector 
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*
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of X and possibly other restricted deterministic variables.  In our case, a deterministic 
trend is included.  The q-dimensional vector Dt contains deterministic terms that are not 
restricted to the cointegrating space, such as constant, trend and seasonal dummies.  The 
summation term contains dynamic elements of the ECM, with maximum lag length, k.  
Note that the r cointegrating relationships in (2) take the form  
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which are stationary linear combinations of the Xt variables under the null of 
cointegration.   14
Hansen incorporates structural change by allowing parameters to change at given 
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where the time-varying parameters are piecewise constant and given by 
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with a similar piecewise form for  1() t Γ ,  1() t Φ , and  () t Ω parameters.   Here, Hansen has 
defined an indicator function to identify the m sub-samples,  
  1 1 1( 1 ), 1,..., , jt j j Tt T j m − ≡ +≤≤ =  (6) 
where  0 0 T ≡  and  0 m T ≡ . 
  Notice that in this specification, the cointegrating space for a sub-sample j is 
defined by the vector  j β , and two sub-samples  i β and  j β are not required to have the 
same number of columns.  This permits in principle for changes in cointegrating rank 
across sub-samples, although in our application a constant cointegrating rank is assumed 
for the complete sample. 
  Hansen shows that the model defined by (2) through (6) can be rewritten as a 
regression equation with constant parameters.  (See Hansen, pp. 4-5, for details.)  
Importantly, the resulting equation takes the form of a reduced rank regression, and so 
properties of the model can be derived from known results on such models (see 
Anderson, 1984, and Johansen, 1995).  Unlike a standard reduced rank regression 
equation, the sub-period structure of Hansen’s model yields a particular block-diagonal 
structure, which can be imposed using a set of linear restrictions.  The model also has a   15
non-constant covariance matrix.  Hansen derives the maximum likelihood estimators for 
the parameters of this “generalized reduced rank regression.” 
Tests for structural change can be conducted by testing for parameter constancy 
across sub-periods using the linear restriction matrices described above.  Hansen shows 
that for the appropriately restricted model, and assuming constant cointegration rank, the 
likelihood ratio test of a restricted model with q fewer parameters against the more 
general model is distributed as 
2 χ  with q degrees of freedom.
8  (See Theorem 14, p. 17.)  
While in principle stability tests can be conducted on all model parameters, in practice 
testing is restricted to a subset of parameters so that the number of free parameters is 
small relative to the sample size.  In this paper, we restrict our attention to possible 
changes in the β  vector that defines the long-run cointegrating relationship. 
An outline of the estimation procedure is as follows.  First, the system is 
estimated assuming constant parameter vectors.  Trace tests are used to indicate the 
cointegration rank of the system.
9  Once a rank for the system has been selected, we 
estimate the unrestricted system that permits a structural break in the cointegrating vector 
β at the time of the trade agreement, and we estimate the system with the restriction that 
the parameter vector is constant across pre- and post-agreement time periods.  We then 
calculate a chi-square test for the restriction in question and compare it to the appropriate 
critical value.  For industries subject to more than one agreement, separate tests of 
parameter constancy are conducted at each agreement date. 
There are several difficulties that arise in implementing this procedure.  First, the 
possibility of structural change raises problems for determining cointegration rank.  Rank 
tests under general structural change have not been derived (Hansen, 2001, p. 21).    16
Nevertheless, we have chosen to report standard rank test results for constant-parameter 
models as a guide to model specification.   In addition, the model of structural change 
used here assumes once-and-for-all shifts in cointegration or adjustment vectors and does 
not allow for gradual change in model parameters following a regime shift.  Because of 
the uncertainty about when the effects of an agreement might first be felt, we have tested 
for breaks within a window of several quarters following the agreement.  This also sheds 
some light on the robustness of estimation results.   
 
V. Data and Results  
Our study focuses on seven industries subject to U.S.-Japan agreements intended 
to raise Japanese imports.  Total non-energy imports were included for comparison 
purposes.  For each sector, time series of real imports and an industry-specific relative 
price were constructed.  The data sources are summarized in Table 2. 
Quarterly import series were derived from monthly trade statistics of the Japan 
Tariff Association, reported in the monthly Summary Report on Trade of Japan.  We 
chose to work with quarterly, rather than monthly time series to remove some of the 
short-term volatility of the underlying series.  Real imports were calculated by deflating 
the nominal series by the appropriate import price index, as outlined below. 
  As discussed above, the choice of categories to study was based in part on the 
availability of data for the targeted products.  For example, while there were closely 
watched agreements covering telecommunication equipment and cellular phones, it was 
not possible to obtain trade data of sufficient detail to construct an appropriate series.   17
Obviously these decisions involve judgment.  Other factors also influenced the selection 
of categories, as described above.   
Import and domestic wholesale prices were constructed from Bank of Japan price 
series published in Price Indexes Annual and available for recent years on the web.  In 
each case, the most closely matching disaggregated price series was used, although for 
one category (auto parts) only a more aggregate import price series was available.  The 
Bank of Japan publishes long time series for only a handful of semi-aggregate categories.  
We have constructed monthly linked price series from the detailed historical price index 
reports, following a similar methodology to that used by the Bank.  The yen-denominated 
monthly indices were aggregated to quarterly series by a simple average as is done by the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) in their own calculation of quarterly statistics.  
As is typically the case, the Japanese import price and import value series are in 
local currency non-inclusive of tariffs.  Since economic decisions are based on relative 
prices inclusive of tariffs, it is important to make adjustments for changes in tariff rates 
over time.  (See Stone, 1979.)  We have made such adjustments to each import price and 
value series using estimated time series of tariff rates for that product, based on tariff line 
data from the Custom Tariff Schedules of Japan.
10  Tariff rates are given in Appendix 
Table A1.  While for many categories the decline in tariffs is fairly small, for tobacco 
tariffs fall from 90% to 35% in a single fiscal year. 
Developments in real income are measured using real gross domestic expenditure 
(GDE) from Japanese national accounts data reported by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (formerly Economic Planning Agency).  All of the series (except   18
GDE) have been seasonally adjusted using the Census X-11 multiplicative procedure, 
and log transformations were taken.
11    
  The time series are shown in Figures 1.1 to 1.9.  For each industry, we have 
graphed real imports against the corresponding relative price series.  In some cases, it is 
clear that changes in relative prices, especially those associated with the yen appreciation 
after 1995, may help to explain movements in import volumes.  (Note, for example, how 
the surge in medicine imports in Figure 1.1 corresponds with the fall in relative import 
prices.)  The structural framework we adopt in this paper is intended to capture such 
fundamental determinants of trade to permit a precise evaluation of trade policy effects. 
 
Unit root tests 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for nonstationarity were 
performed on each data series.  Results are reported in Appendix Table A2.  The tests 
show strong evidence of unit roots in all of the series with or without trends at standard 
significance levels.   
A number of the series also appear to have deterministic trends.  Therefore, in the 
cointegration analysis below we allowed for a possible trend in the DGP.  
 
Cointegration and Structural Change 
Table 3 reports the results of trace tests for the rank of the cointegrating space for 
each of the models.
12  For four of the seven industries and for aggregate non-energy 
imports we can reject the null of no cointegrating vector at the 95% confidence level.  In 
the case of passenger cars the test statistic is very near the 5% critical value for rejection.  
For the two remaining series (tobacco and paper) evidence of cointegration is weaker.    19
There are no cases where a rank of two is indicated, although test statistics for 
semiconductors and lumber are close to the 5% critical values.   
There are difficulties interpreting cointegration test results in our setting.  First, 
the existence of a structural break might lead to incorrect inference.
13  In addition, 
cointegration tests in small samples may be biased, and there appears to be no consensus 
in the literature on the how best to address this bias (Maddala and Kim, pp. 214-220).  In 
the analysis that follows, we assume a rank of one for all models, and we proceed to test 
for structural change in the single cointegrating vector associated with the largest 
eigenvalue of the system.   
In Table 4, we report the result of tests of structural stability in the cointegrating 
vector near the date of the relevant U.S.-Japan trade agreement(s).  In each case, we also 
report normalized cointegrating vectors under the assumption that parameters are 
constant over the entire sample, and under the alternative hypothesis of a structural break.  
If the rank of the system is one, it may be reasonable to interpret the single cointegrating 
vector as an import demand function, so we have normalized the vector accordingly.
14  In 
this case, the coefficients represent long-run elasticities of real imports with respect to 
income (real GDP) and relative price.   
Looking first at coefficients of the constant parameter case, we note that elasticity 
estimates do not uniformly conform to theory.  Income elasticities are generally positive 
and between 0.8 and 1.4, consistent with the range of estimates reported in the literature, 
with the notable exceptions of passenger cars and tobacco.
15  Relative price elasticities 
show more variation, with several displaying a perverse positive effect.  The latter may 
reflect lack of price sensitivity of demand, the influence of supply in this underidentified   20
system (see footnote 14), or biased estimation due to structural change.  For aggregate 
non-energy imports, relative price also enters with a small perverse positive sign.  The 
deterministic trend coefficients are all positive, consistent with persistent increase in 
import penetration and product variety over this period.
16  
Turning to the stability test results, note that for each industry there is at least one 
agreement in the vicinity of which we can reject parameter constancy.  Because of 
uncertainty about when the effects of a new agreement might be felt, we report tests for a 
four-quarter window that includes the agreement quarter itself and three succeeding 
quarters.  In the case of the 1990 Wood Products Agreement, a significant break is 
detected only after three quarters have elapsed.   
While these break test results, taken as a whole, appear to support a significant 
impact of trade agreements on import relationships, inspection of pre- and post-break 
cointegrating relationships in some cases casts doubt on this interpretation.  For 
passenger cars, pre-break parameter estimates frequently have perverse signs, and post-
break elasticities are unbelievably large.  Parameter signs for tobacco and the pre-break 
sample for paper are also perverse.  For autos and tobacco, the estimation results at 
adjacent candidate break points demonstrate considerable instability.  (This is true to a 
lesser extent for auto parts and lumber.)  While one might take such sensitivity as 
evidence that only break points in certain periods are “correct,” we are concerned that it 
may also signal a fundamental difficulty fitting a robust import model over the relatively 
short available samples.   
In addition to the sensitivity of structural parameters to particular break points, 
the direction of change of parameters between pre- and post-break samples does not   21
always appear consistent with a positive impact of the agreement on import volumes.  In 
the case of the 1990 Wood Products Agreement, for example, both the income elasticity 
and deterministic trend fall after the trade agreement.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, the industry where the clearest support is evident for a 
positive trade agreement effect is semiconductors.
17  At the time of the first 
semiconductor trade agreement in 1986, there is a significant break in the parameter 
vector.  Estimation under the assumption of a break yields larger income and price 
elasticities for both pre-and post-break samples than emerges under the null of constant 
parameters and a post-break deterministic trend growth rate that is 2% higher than in the 
pre-agreement period.  A similar result occurs at the time of the second STA, where the 
difference between pre- and post-agreement trends is 1.6%, although the structural break 
is not significant at the 95% level.  Elasticity estimates are fairly stable within the four-
quarter window following the agreements, except for the break test at 1992Q2. 
Auto parts and medicine results also provide some support for a positive policy 
impact.  Both income and relative price elasticities rise in the period following the 1992 
Auto and Auto Parts Plan (although the deterministic trend parameter declines slightly).  
While there is also a significant structural break at the time of the 1987 auto agreement, 
parameter estimates for subsamples vary erratically.  Both U.S.-Japan agreements 
affecting medical and pharmaceutical products appear to raised income and price 
sensitivity of these imports, although again there was a small accompanying decline in 
the deterministic trend. 
For comparison purposes, we also analyze structural change in a quarterly index 
of aggregate non-energy imports.  Testing for breaks at the time of the Plaza and Louvre   22
accords, we find that the latter is significant at the 95% level, while the former is very 
nearly so.  Admission of a break yields elasticity estimates that more closely conform to 
expectations, with income elasticity well above unity, and a significant negative price 
elasticity for both pre- and post-break samples.  Post-break import price sensitivity is 
lower, perhaps reflecting changing behavior in the face of the extraordinary price 
changes that occurred during this period.  This is consistent with the argument by 
Greaney (2000), Lincoln (1999), and others that large relative price changes were needed 
to break old buying patterns.  The deterministic trend component of import growth 
increased by about 1% in the post-break period.  An arbitrary mid-sample break test does 
not reject the null of constant parameters, perhaps dispelling concern that the break tests 
are prone to detecting spurious breaks.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
We have evaluated the effectiveness of U.S.-Japan trade agreements by looking 
for structural breaks in import behavior near the time of the agreements.  The method we 
have employed tests for a change in behavioral parameters within the context of an 
empirical import demand model.  In this way, we are able to look for evidence of policy 
impacts while controlling for the “normal” influence of income and relative prices on 
import volumes. 
The empirical results we have assembled here paint a mixed image of the 
effectiveness of trade agreements.  We do find evidence that the Semiconductor Trade 
Agreement (especially the first one) caused a trend increase in semiconductor imports.  
This is consistent with the predominant view by both researchers and industry experts   23
that the agreement was a success, at least on purely mercantilist grounds.  Imports of auto 
parts appear to have become more income and price elastic after the 1992 agreement, and 
medical products following both 1986 and 1994 accords.  In both cases, however, there 
were slight declines in the deterministic trend component.  Models for paper and lumber, 
while exhibiting breaks, did not support net positive impacts from the trade agreements.   
In other cases, including the effect of the highly touted 1992 auto accord on 
assembled passenger cars, while break tests reject parameter constancy, the structural 
trade models are not well behaved.  Estimated parameters for pre- and post-break 
samples differ dramatically when the hypothesized break point is moved by one quarter.  
We fear that this may reflect difficulty reliably estimating the standard empirical trade 
model when the available data samples are fairly short.   
This is an important issue.  Reliable detection of an agreement’s impact on trade 
flows depends on satisfactory modeling of the underlying import behavior.  Without a 
model of how imports depend on economic fundamentals it is simply not possible to tell 
whether an acceleration of imports is due to a policy change or evolution of the 
fundamentals themselves.  In our view, the results of trade agreement studies that ignore 
the influence of fundamentals cannot be relied upon.  Relatively short samples may be at 
the heart of the problem, or it may be that the standard trade model is not well suited to 
modeling disaggregated Japanese imports.  Further research in this area is needed.   
It is important to note that statistical structural break analysis of the kind applied 
here will always be subject to a difficulty of attribution.  While a trade agreement or 
other policy shift could cause a structural change in model parameters, so too could 
changes in consumer behavior or in the structure of the industry or economic   24
environment.  We try to isolate the effect of trade agreements by testing for change only 
in the vicinity of the agreement, but certainly that does not eliminate the possibility that 
changes in import propensities or the rise of an important popular product (say, the 
Pentium chip) could explain the import change. 
Agreements to raise U.S. imports into the Japanese market became a central part 
of U.S.-Japan trade policy in the 1980s and 1990s.  They are likely to play an important 
role in other bilateral relationships in coming years.  Recently, the U.S. auto industry has 
begun to agitate for actions to open the Korean automobile market to American cars and 
parts, and the growing Chinese current account surplus promises to create pressure for 
market opening there as well.  Before additional political capital is spent negotiating such 
agreements, one would like better evidence on their effectiveness.  Our analysis argues 
for a structural approach to gathering such evidence, but also highlights the challenges 
involved in doing so.   25
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Table 1. A Timeline of Selected U.S.-Japan Trade Agreements 
Date   Policy  Summary 
January 9, 1986  Report on Medical and 
Pharmaceutical MOSS Discussions 
Reduced regulatory red-tape for 
foreign medical/pharmaceutical 
products and devices 
Announced July 
31; signed 
September 2, 1986 
Semiconductor Trade Agreement  Targeted increase of market share in 
Japan from 8% to 20%. Also 
implemented FMVs for Japanese 
exports. 
January 10, 1986  Wood Products Agreement  Reduce tariffs on select lumber and 
wood products; consultations on 
building code 
October 6, 1986  Tobacco Trade Agreement  Eliminated import duties on foreign 
tobacco; loosened restrictive 
distribution system. 
August 18, 1987  MOSS Talks on Transportation 
Machinery 
Talks on standards, testing, and 
cooperation; established acceptability 
of foreign parts for repairs. 
June 15, 1990  Wood Products Agreement  Additional tariff reductions; building 
standards changes to permit wood use 
June 11, 1991  Semiconductor Trade Agreement 2  Reconfirmed goal of “gradual and 
steady progress” toward 20% U.S. 
market share target; resolved dumping 
complaints. 
January 9, 1992  Auto and Auto Parts Plan  To double imports of U.S. autos parts 
by 1994; increase purchase of auto 
parts by Japanese affiliates 
April 5, 1992  Measures to Increase Market 
Access for Paper Products 
To promote private sector purchases 
and overall market promotion of 
foreign paper. 
November 1, 1994  Measures Related to Japanese 
Public-Sector Procurement of 
Medical Technology 
New measures and guidelines for 
public procurement of medical 
technology, products and services. 
August 23, 1995  Japan Automotive Agreement  Increase dealerships in Japan; further 
increase in auto parts imports though 
no numerical targets were agreed upon
Source:  American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (1997, 2000).   35
 
Table 2.  The Data 
 
Category  Series No./Description  Import Price  Dom. WS Price  Sample 
Medicine  No. 507 Medicinal and 
Pharmaceutical Products 





dev, I.C.s, etc. 
Integrated 
Circuits 
Integrated Circuits  1980:1-2000:4 





Paper  No. 60701 Paper and 
Paperboard 
Paper  Paper and Paperboard  1980:1-2000:4 
Lumber  No. 2070703 Lumber  Lumber  Lumber  1980:1-2000:4 
Passenger 
Cars 
No. 7050101  
Passenger motor cars 
Passenger Cars  Passenger Cars  1980:1-2000:4 
Auto Parts  No. 70503 
Parts of road motor vehicles 









Non-oil Weighted Ave 
Dom WPI 
1980:1-2000:4 
Sources:  quarterly trade values are simple aggregates of monthly data from the Japan Tariff Bureau, 
Summary Report on Trade of Japan, various issues; import and domestic prices are from Bank of Japan, 
Price Indexes Annual, various issues (data since 1995 from BoJ web site). The tobacco series was truncated 
to avoid a massive tariff change in the first quarter of 1980 (from 335% to 90%). 
   36
  Table 3. Cointegration Trace Tests 
  Rank = 0  Rank >= 1  Rank >= 2 
Medicine   53.6*  (42.2)   14.8 (25.5)    4.6 (12.4) 
Semiconductors   50.7*  (42.2)   23.3 (25.5)    8.5 (12.4) 
Tobacco   34.4 (42.2)   11.7 (25.5)    3.8 (12.4) 
Paper   36.5 (42.2)   13.2 (25.5)    3.4 (12.4) 
Lumber   48.8*  (42.2)   23.8 (25.5)    5.1 (12.4) 
Passenger  Cars   40.7 (42.2)   19.9 (25.5)    5.4 (12.4) 
Auto Parts    42.4* (42.2)    21.1 (25.5)    6.5  (12.4) 
Total Non-Energy Imports    49.5* (42.2)     18.3  (25.5)    3.4  (12.4) 
Note:  A VAR with four lags was used in each case.  While trace test results are presented here, 
they are merely suggestive of possible cointegrating relationships among the variables. Formal 
tests for rank with structural changes are currently unavailable (Hansen, 2001). Figures in 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1980 7  7.1  90  6.5  3.75 0  5.3  2.1 
1981 6.9  8.6  35  6.7  3.75 0  0  2.1 
1982 6.4  8.9  35  5.9  3.39 0  0  2.2 
1983 6.3  5.6  20  5.6  3.39 0  0  2.1 
1984 6  4.2  19.7 5.2  2.72 0  0  2.1 
1985 5.4  0  20.4 4.9  2.39 0  0  2.2 
1986 4  0  23.9 3.8  2.28 0  0  2.7 
1987  4  0  0 3.5  2.03  0  0 2.8 
1988  3.2  0  0 3.7  2.11  0  0 3.0 
1989  3.2  0  0 3.3  2.11  0  0 2.6 
1990  2.3  0  0 3.1  2.00  0  0 2.4 
1991  2.2  0  0 3.1  2.00  0  0 3.0 
1992  2  0  0 3.1  2.00  0  0 3.1 
1993  2  0  0 3.1  2.00  0  0 3.3 
1994  2  0  0 3.1  2.00  0  0 3.1 
1995  0  0  0 3 2.00  0  0 2.9 
1996  0  0  0 2.8  2.00  0  0 2.6 
1997  0  0  0 2.3  2.00  0  0 2.4 
1998  0  0  0 2.1  2.00  0  0 2.5 
1999  0  0  0 1.8  2.00  0  0 2.2 
2000  0  0  0 1.4  2.00  0  0 2.4 
Note: these rates are for each Japanese fiscal year, which begins on April 1
st and ends on March 31
st. 
Monthly price and trade data were adjusted accordingly. Data used for the first quarter of 1980 may have had 
differing rates, but are not reported in this table. 
 
   40
Appendix Table A2.  Unit Root Tests 
  ADF, no trend  ADF, trend  P-P, no trend  P-P, trend 
Medicine Imports  -1.59  -1.21  -1.46  -1.66 
Medicine RP  -1.84  -2.41  -2.05  -2.22 
Semiconductor Imports  -0.19  -2.35  -0.21  -0.21 
Semiconductor RP  -1.49  -1.81  -1.45  -1.42 
Tobacco Imports  -1.62  -0.70  -1.28  -0.77 
Tobacco RP  -1.87  -1.29  -2.53  -1.13 
Paper Imports   -2.15  -2.17  -1.28  -2.74 
Paper RP  -1.72  -1.24  -1.32  -1.66 
Lumber Imports  -1.86  -1.38  -1.51  -1.90 
Lumber RP  -2.01  -1.99  -2.97*  -2.93 
Passenger Cars Imports  -1.67  -1.50  -0.85  -1.38 
Passenger Cars RP  -1.83  -2.22  -1.85  -2.59 
Auto Parts Imports  -1.16  -2.00  -0.96  -2.43 
Auto Parts RP  -1.77  -2.25  -1.92  -2.69 
Total Non-Energy Imports  -0.24  -2.61  -0.07  -2.12 
Total Non-Energy RP  -1.12  -2.13  -1.80  -2.30 
Real GDE  -1.77  -0.39  -2.07  0.60 
Note: All tests shown are in levels. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests used four lags and Phillips-
Perron (P-P) tests used a truncation lag of three. Lag length selection for the ADF tests was based on AIC 
and SC. For the P-P tests, the automatic truncation lag suggested by Newey and West (1994) based on the 
number of observations is employed.  All t-stats (save one) fall well below MacKinnon critical values for 
10%, 5% and 1%. Tests on first differences of all variables (not reported here) strongly rejected the unit 
root hypothesis at a 1% level. 
 * significant at 5% level. 
Endnotes   41
 
1 Japan has a long history of friction with foreign trade partners.  Over the years, foreign 
governments have responded with a range of policies to protect specific industries 
including orderly marketing agreements, the use and threatened use of retaliatory duties, 
voluntary export restraints (VERs), as well as pressure for tariff and quota concessions 
under the GATT/WTO.  The recent shift in emphasis from domestic protection to 
opening Japanese markets in part reflects increased constraints—after a generation of 
multilateral trade liberalization—to the use of many of the traditional trade protection 
tools.  For example, VERs, the mainstay of U.S. policy in the 1980s, became effectively 
illegal under the Uruguay Round GATT accord.   
2 Japan has also acted (ostensibly) unilaterally to raise imports, notably in an early-1990s 
policy package that included unilateral tariff reductions, changes in licensing procedures, 
infrastructure investments geared toward trade, and explicit tax incentives for raising 
imports.  See MITI-JETRO, c1993. 
3 This is the so-called “Armington Assumption” commonly employed in estimation of 
trade equations, which first appeared in Armington (1969).  For more discussion of the 
micro foundations of import demand and a summary of empirical studies through the 
early 1980s, see Goldstein and Kahn (1985). 
4 While commonplace, the log-linear specification is not without its detractors.  See, for 
example, Marquez (1999). 
5 See Campbell and Perron (1991) for a summary of the importance of unit roots and 
cointegration in time series data. 
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6 For a thorough introduction to the history of unit roots and cointegration as well as an 
excellent presentation of the recent advances, methodologies and future direction of 
cointegration, see Maddala and Kim (1999).   
7
 The tests for parameter constancy presented here were done using the Maximum 
Likelihood Analysis of Cointegrated Processes (MLECO) GAUSS code obtained from 
Peter Hansen’s web site at http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Peter_Hansen/.  Other 
preliminary diagnostic tests were done in Eviews or PcGive. 
8 For a general discussion of likelihood ratio tests see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
9 We have included four lags of each variable in the VAR when estimating the 
cointegrated systems.  As is well known in the literature, incorrect lag specification can 
cause size distortion or loss of power (Maddala and Kim, 1999).  Results for several 
common selection criteria (AIC, SC, and HQ) varied considerably, but generally ranged 
from three to five lags, with four or five lags most common.  Given the relatively small 
sample size, we have decided to err on the side of parsimony.  Full sample elasticities 
varied little whether four or five lags were used. 
10 Where tariff line detail could be matched closely with corresponding trade value data 
(and the number of tariff lines was not prohibitively large), weighted average tariff rates 
were constructed for the import category in question.  This was true for tobacco, 
semiconductors, and autos.  For paper, medicines, and auto parts, appropriate weights 
were not available, and a simple average of tariff lines was used.  In each case, average 
tariffs rates for the commodity or category were calculated for each of the twenty years 
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(1980-2000), and these rates were used to ‘mark-up’ the corresponding series by that 
percentage. 
For overall non-energy imports we took a different tack. Rather than attempting a 
simple or weighted average over thousands of categories, we followed Clemens and 
Williamson (2001) in deriving an implicit overall tariff rate by dividing the total tariff 
revenue by total import value. Interestingly, despite the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
and other unilateral tariff reductions conducted by Japan over the past 20 years, the 
average tariff rate has declined very little. 
11 There is some debate as to whether or not seasonally adjusting the series, aggregation, 
and log transformations are appropriate. For a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantage of each, see Maddala and Kim (1999). 
12 In all cases, four lagged difference terms were included in the vector error correction 
models.  See note 9, above. 
13 Cointegration rank tests under structural change do not exist in the literature (Hansen, 
2001). 
14 This interpretation is supported by an inspection of adjustment (loading) coefficients in 
the three-variable vector error correction model.  In all cases, the adjustment coefficient 
on the error correction term in the import equation has the expected negative sign.  For 
the real GDP and relative price equations, in about half the cases adjustment coefficients 
are positive.  In fact, we have not identified structural import demand equations from the 
VAR system, so interpretation of the cointegrating relationship could actually represent a 
linear combination of both demand and supply effects.   
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15 Goldstein and Kahn (1985), surveying empirical research from 1973 to the early 1980s, 
report an average income elasticity for aggregate imports of 1.2 and an average price 
elasticity of –0.95 (for those studies with a significant negative price elasticity).  Hooper 
and Marquez (1995) report a mean import price elasticity of –0.97 from 13 studies dating 
back to 1996.  The range of estimates is very large, for example price elasticity estimates 
range from –3.4 to –0.26 in the studies reviewed by Hooper and Marquez.  More recent 
estimates of Japanese income (price) elasticities include Assery and Peel (1991), 1.36 (-
0.64); Ceglowski (1996), 0.73 (-0.67); and Caporale and Chui (1999), 1.33 (-0.33).  
Elasticity estimates also vary widely for different commodities.  See, for example, 
Ceglowski (1996). 
16 Inclusion of a time trend reduces unrealistically large income elasticities in a number 
of sectors, suggesting the importance correctly identifying deterministic sources of 
import growth separate from the influences of income and relative prices. 
17 This result differs from that found in Parsons (2002) which found no structural break in 
either the long run cointegration parameters, nor in the adjustment coefficients. One 
could argue that the more focused exogenous testing procedure employed here is more 
powerful given the use of a priori information concerning the timing of the policy. Yet, it 
also highlights the sensitivity of results to differing econometric methodologies, 
particularly in small samples. 